Does China matter? The global economic issues by Harris, Stuart
 Working Paper 2003/1 
Does China matter? The 
global economic issues 
STUART HARRIS 
 
Canberra, September 2003 

 Published by Department of International Relations 
RSPAS 
Australian National University 
Canberra  ACT  0200 
Australia 
Tel: +61 (2) 6125 2166 
Fax: +61 (2) 6125 8010 
Email: intrel@anu.edu.au 
Web: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir 
Cover by RTM Design. 
Harris, Stuart, 1931-  . 
Does China matter? : the global economic issues. 
ISBN 0 7315 3126 4. 
1. Economic forecasting - China. 2. Globalization - 
Economic aspects - China. 3. China - Foreign economic 
relations. 4. China - Economic conditions - 2000-. 5. 
China - Economic policy - 2000- . I. Australian National  
University. Dept. of International Relations. II. Title.  
(Series : Working paper (Australian National University. 
Dept. of International Relations) ; no. 2003/1). 
337.51 
© Stuart Harris 
Department of International Relations 
Working Papers 
The Department’s Working Paper series provides readers with access to 
current research on international relations. Reflecting the Department’s 
intellectual profile, the series includes topics on the general theoretical and 
empirical study of international and global politics, the political dynamics 
and developments in the Asia–Pacific region, and the intersection between 
the two. 
Publication as a ‘Working Paper’ does not preclude subsequent public-
cation in scholarly journals or books, indeed it may facilitate publication by 
providing feedback from readers to authors. 
Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Department of International 
Relations are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public 
record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and 
conclusions. 
  
Abstract 
In 1999, Gerry Segal, then Director of Research at the International 
Institute of Strategic Studies, wrote an article in Foreign Affairs entitled 
‘Does China matter?’. His article ranged across economic, political and 
strategic issues but his overall conclusion was that China’s importance 
had been greatly exaggerated. As far as economic questions were 
concerned, Segal saw China as a small market ‘that matters little to the 
world, especially outside Asia’. 
This paper argues that while Segal was correct in the view that there had 
been considerable exaggeration of China’s economic weight, mostly 
outside of China, his generalisation now needs qualification. The paper 
considers the standard economic comparisons across countries such as 
GDP, trade and investment volumes and other areas of China’s growing 
global economic involvement. It also deals with issues such as the 
accuracy of China’s growth statistics. It concludes with the idea that China 
does now matter to the world both for its substance and for its evident 
potential. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I discuss whether Gerald Segal’s views on China’s economic 
importance, a key component of his Foreign Affairs article ‘Does China 
matter?’, are still valid. In his previous writings on China, Segal had 
largely confined himself to the political and strategic implications of a 
rising China. The more detailed consideration of economics in his article 
was therefore something of an exception. 
Segal argued that ‘China is a small market that matters relatively little to 
the world, especially outside Asia’.2 Although in earlier exchanges with 
Gerry I had argued against the China threat on the grounds that China 
would remain relatively unimportant for a considerable time, this was only 
partly on economic grounds.3 Segal was correct that the public debate had 
tended to over emphasise China’s economic weight. Even so, at the time, 
his generalisation was unduly dismissive. In part perhaps this reflected the 
influence of the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis. Some of the pessimism 
then prevalent, especially in Europe, about the inability of Asia generally 
and China in particular to weather the crisis has abated. In any case the 
economic argument now needs to be qualified. We now have a longer 
experience of China’s management of its economy on which to base our 
evaluations.  
 
1  Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian 
National University. This paper will be published in Rosemary Foot and Barry Buzan, eds, 
Revisiting Gerry Segal’s ‘Does China matter?’ (London: Routledge, forthcoming). Comments on an 
earlier draft from Ross Garnaut, Rosemary Foot and Barry Buzan are gratefully acknowledged. 
Sadly, Gerry Segal died of cancer in November 1999.  
2  Gerald Segal, ‘Does China matter?’, Foreign Affairs 78(5) September/October 1999, pp. 24–36, at 
p. 25. 
3  My arguments were subsequently published in Stuart Harris, ‘The People’s Republic of China’s 
quest for great power status: A long and winding road’, in Tien Hung-mao and Yuh-han Chu, eds, 
China under Jiang Zemin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 
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Segal’s conclusion that judgements of China’s economic importance 
were based on its assumed potential remain largely true today but, while 
still often exaggerated, that potential is more evidently substantial and is 
being factored into both expectations and global economic decision-
making. So China does now matter. Of course, although China’s actual and 
potential importance is greater than Segal allowed, China’s economic 
importance is still conditional on China continuing its reform process and its 
economic progress. Failure in those respects will give China an importance 
in much less welcome ways, creating political and social instability 
regionally and inevitably globally. I would also note that China’s own 
perceptions of that prospective economic importance reflect a greater 
recognition of its economic weaknesses than Segal acknowledged.  
To answer the Segal question, ‘does China matter?’, I need to ask what 
determines whether a country ‘matters’? Specifically, how does a country 
‘matter’ in global economic terms? His article advanced a number of 
measures against which to judge China’s importance: the proportion of 
world gross domestic product (GDP); income per head; inter-province trade 
within China; the proportion of world trade and of Asian trade; the share of 
US, European and Asian country exports; and the share of inwards global 
and regional foreign direct investment (FDI). Segal concluded that Asia as a 
whole, apart from Japan, has little impact on the global economy, as 
illustrated by the Asian crisis, and that exaggerating China is part of 
exaggerating Asia.  
Here, I address a number of the Segal criteria directly relevant to 
assessing China’s global significance. There are, of course, other ways to 
consider China’s economic importance—or whether China ‘matters’. For 
example, will China’s economy influence the global economy in providing 
either a locomotive or a drag on global economic activity? It was judged to 
have behaved responsibly during the Asian crisis by not devaluing its 
currency; how far will its actions in the future affect global currency 
movements and how co-operative will it then be? Again, as some argue, 
does China’s industrial development threaten living standards and jobs 
internationally?  
A broader sense of China’s economic importance is what it represents in 
terms of power and influence. Put simply, to what extent does China’s 
economy enable it to influence others in directions it wants them to go, or to 
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avoid directions it opposes. This influence can be achieved, as with any 
country, basically by coercion, bribery or persuasion. Coercion is usually 
thought of in military terms, with economic strength as a critical basis for 
military strength and this is an issue for some in the US, as I note later.  
Economic coercion, however, including withdrawal of economic rela-
tionships, is an important potential weapon itself and a factor in Chinese 
thinking, with examples of its use in practice, as with its purchases of civil 
aircraft. I will ask how much freedom China has to coerce in an increasingly 
interdependent global economy. It is also relevant to ask not just about 
capabilities but about the use China might make of its added power. That, 
however, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
CHINA’S ECONOMY 
A country’s share of global GDP is a traditional indicator of its overall 
economic weight. In 2000, on standard GDP measures, China was sixth in 
global rankings, after France but above Italy. (Adding Hong Kong and 
Macau puts it closer to, but still below France.) Segal saw the sixth 
ranking of China in global GDP terms as indicating merely middle power 
status. He noted that China’s GDP was only 3.4 per cent (3.7 per cent in 
2001) of global GDP, compared with the 31.2 per cent (32.5 per cent in 
2001) of the United States. In a sense he was right. Yet Russia, ranking 
only seventeenth, is now effectively a member, as is Canada, of the G8, 
purportedly comprising the major economic powers. And China is larger 
than both Canada and Russia on standard measures.  
But there are analytical problems with the standard comparisons based 
on market exchange rates that are especially relevant to China’s potential 
role in the global economy. For international comparisons, use is made 
increasingly of purchasing power parity (PPP) measures of GDP.4 Segal 
acknowledged these measures but negatively, referring to them as the ‘now-
dubious purchasing-power-parity calculations’.5 
 
4  The World Bank’s PPP measures are obtained by converting gross domestic product using 
conversion factors provided by the International Comparisons Programme, a joint effort of the 
World Bank and the UN regional economic commissions.  
5  Segal, ‘Does China matter?’, p. 25. 
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Since PPP measures are analytically important here, not just because of 
the global comparisons of GDP—I draw on them later in assessing China’s 
potential—I need to detail what they represent. Standard comparisons of 
GDPs across countries convert national currency aggregates to a common 
currency—the US dollar exchange rate. Among the problems with this 
approach is that individual country exchange rates are affected differentially 
by various policy and other influences; moreover, major short term swings 
occur in market based exchange rate values, including that of the US dollar. 
Thus, such conversions can give an erratic picture, making difficult valid 
comparisons of real product levels between countries.  
Moreover, a large proportion of commercial exchanges which make up a 
country’s GDP are not traded and their prices may not follow, in the short to 
medium term, movements in the exchange rate. Thus the US dollar value of 
what the average Chinese can purchase in their own currency can mislead, 
especially by undervaluing their benefits from the cheaper labour intensive 
non-traded sector. Consequently, for comparisons, economists increasingly 
use PPP measures, based on the cost of a basket of traded and non-traded 
goods and services across countries. This approach values the number of 
units of a country’s currency required to buy the same quantity of 
comparable goods and services in the local market as one US dollar would 
buy in the US.6 
In looking at a country’s international purchasing power overall, its 
ability to service foreign debt or to import foreign military equipment, 
market or official exchange rates remain the relevant measures. 
Nevertheless, sufficient analytical work on, and using, PPP estimates has 
invalidated the Segal reference to them as ‘dubious’ for the comparative 
purposes to which he referred. PPP rates are generally accepted as superior 
for comparison purposes, especially where developing countries are 
involved. They are used extensively by the World Bank, the International 
 
6  World Bank, World Development Report 2003 (New York: World Bank and Oxford University 
Press, 2003), p. 245; Steve Dowrick, ‘G-20 comparisons of incomes and prices: What can we learn 
from the international comparison program?’, in David Gruen, Terry O’Brien and Jeremy Lawson, 
eds, Globalisation, living standards and inequality: Recent progress and continuing challenges, 
Proceedings of a conference held in Sydney, 27–28 May 2002 (Sydney and Canberra: Reserve Bank 
of Australia and Australian Treasury, 2002), p. 222, <www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/ 
Conferences/2002/index.html>. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) and the OECD and are regarded by the UN 
Statistical Commission as the appropriate basis for international com-
parisons of the economic size of countries and, on a per head basis, the 
economic wellbeing of their residents.  
In the short to medium term, the differences can be large.7 Notably, 
however, exchange rate measures tend to undervalue systematically the 
GDPs of developing countries, including China. On a PPP basis, China’s 
economy ranks second in the world after the United States, larger than 
Japan’s economy. Its proportionate share of global GDP amounts to 11.2 per 
cent compared with the 21.4 per cent for the US. 
World Bank PPP data show some over valuation of the exchange rates in 
some developed countries and considerable under valuation in many 
developing countries.8 In the long run, market exchange and PPP rates are 
likely to move towards convergence, and relatively fast-growing countries 
to experience real exchange rate appreciations.9 If so this would raise their 
GDP values relative to those of developed countries beyond their growth 
rate in national money terms.  
Ross Garnaut demonstrated that in the 1980s and 1990s, the GDPs of 
some rapidly growing Asian countries, converted at US dollar exchange 
rates, rose more rapidly relative to developed countries than differences in 
real growth rates would suggest.10 He notes, for example, that real income 
per head in Singapore rose from US$8,000 in 1985 to US$28,000 in 1996. 
 
7  PPP based comparisons are themselves not without problems of data, including an equivalent of the 
index number problem. Present calculation methods also tend to overstate the differences between 
market and PPP exchange rate based figures for developing countries, including China, but not 
enough to invalidate their use and general conclusions drawn from them. See Dowrick, ‘G-20 
comparisons of incomes and prices’.  
8  World Bank, World Development Report 2003, pp. 234–5. PPP based estimates do reflect differences 
in developed countries; in the case of Japan, for example, in 2001, GDP on a PPP basis was over 20 
per cent less than that based on market exchange rates, presumably reflecting particularly the high 
price of non-traded goods in Japan.  
9  Kenneth Froot and Kenneth Rogoff, ‘Perspectives on PPP and long run real exchanges rates’, in 
Gene Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff, eds, Handbook on international economics, Volume 3 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995), pp. 1648–84, at pp. 1648, 1683. 
10  Ross Garnaut, ‘Catching up with America’, in Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song, eds, China 2002: 
WTO entry and world recession (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2002), pp. 1–16. 
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The growth in GDP per head, in exchange rate based international com-
parisons, was well ahead of the real growth rate measured in national 
currency terms. The significance is that China may catch up with or surpass 
the GDPs of developed countries in US dollar terms more rapidly than 
national growth rate arithmetic would suggest.  
Segal noted a disposition to mistrust the accuracy of China’s growth rate 
statistics arguing that official Chinese figures have exaggerated China’s 
growth since the market reforms of 1978. There has been a considerable 
argument, inside as well as outside China, over what are the correct figures, 
to which a critical Zhu Rongji contributed. This was largely stimulated by 
the failure of the official figures to reflect the 1997–98 downturn and the 
build-up of stocks of unwanted goods.11 Many observers judged that official 
figures could overestimate real growth by perhaps 1 or 2 per cent.12 
Thomas Rawski, a major critic of China’s official growth data, notes that 
under-reporting of the service and private sectors probably offsets over-
reporting elsewhere, at least until 1997, and that the official figures from 
1978 to 1997 may be about right. He had argued, however, that compared 
with official figures averaging 7.5 per cent for 1998–2001, the real figures 
are closer to half—or 3.8 per cent.13 Other evidence of greater growth than 
this in those years leads others, such as Nicholas Lardy to doubt this.14 A 
growing consensus suggests that the official figures may have a margin of 
error of a percentage point either way.15 Overall, therefore, greater 
credibility now attaches to the official figures of average annual growth of 
9.5 per cent from 1979–2001 with little doubt existing about what has 
clearly been substantial and sustained growth.  
 
11  Thomas Rawski, ‘Measuring China’s recent GDP growth: Where do we stand?’, China Economic 
Quarterly 2(1) October 2002. 
12  Nicholas Lardy, China’s unfinished economic revolution (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
1998), p. 9; Angus Maddison, China’s economic performance in the long run (Paris: OECD, 1998), 
p. 155. 
13  Thomas Rawski, ‘Where’s the growth?’, Asian Wall Street Journal 19 April 2002. 
14  Nicholas Lardy, ‘Integrating China into the global economy’, Address at Rice University, Houston, 
29 April 2002, <www.ruf.rice.edu/~tnchina/commentary/lardy042902.html>. 
15  ‘Truth or consequences: China’s GDP numbers’, China Economic Quarterly 7(1) 2003 Q1, p. 32. 
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And Segal’s other criteria? His dismissal of China’s low income per head 
ranking noted that this was less than that of Papua New Guinea (PNG). This 
has changed; in 2001, income per head in China was significantly above 
that of PNG on conventional as well as PPP measures, closer to levels, for 
example, of the Philippines.16 In any case, for present purposes, this 
measure is less significant in China’s situation. While China remains a poor 
country despite its large economy, the size of China’s population means that 
the government could collect taxes on a very much larger tax base if it 
wished. 
China’s economy has opened up significantly in the last two decades. It 
had reduced its trade barriers substantially well before it joined the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and its membership is stimulating further 
liberalisation. China’s openness is usually indicated by the growing 
proportion that trade represents of China’s GDP, exports amounting to some 
22 per cent in 2002. Yet, these figures exaggerate the openness: on PPP 
measures of GDP, exports as a proportion of GDP constitute just under 6 per 
cent. This compares, on the same basis, with around 18 per cent for the UK, 
and 12 per cent for Japan. Comparable levels would not be expected, 
however, since this reflects a pattern common to large economies. Thus, on 
the same basis, trade is only between 7 and 8 per cent of GDP for the US.  
Certainly, in the trade and investment field, China’s global importance 
has grown. China is already a major trading nation, ranking sixth in 2002 as 
a global exporter, just behind the UK. China’s trade, not including Hong 
Kong, in that year represented 4.7 per cent of global trade, compared with 2 
per cent only ten years earlier (over 7 per cent if Hong Kong is included). Its 
trade with Asia exceeds that outside the region but the US is its major 
export market and the European Union (EU) its third major market; Japan, 
however, remains its major trading partner. Although still small in services 
trade, it increased its share of global service trade exports more than 
threefold in ten years to 2.3 per cent in 2001. Overall in recent years China’s 
exports and imports have grown more rapidly than the global average and 
are expected to continue to do so.  
 
16  For 2001, income per head for China was US$890 (or $4260 in PPP terms); for Papua New Guinea 
it was $580 (or $2150). 
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Segal set trade with the major trading countries as one of his criteria. 
Although growing, China’s trade with the major traders is not especially 
substantial. Imports by China account for less than 3 per cent of US 
merchandise exports but the US takes about a third of China’s exports (as a 
share of US imports it now accounts for some 9 per cent as against 3 per 
cent in 1990). If Hong Kong exports, substantially from China, were 
included, this would add another 5.8 per cent to the share of US imports 
from China/Hong Kong. China is a smaller trader with the EU. Only 1.2 per 
cent of EU exports go to China (excluding intra-EU trade it rises to 5.5 per 
cent). The role of foreign enterprises in generating exports has been 
significant. Foreign invested firms now account for over 50 per cent of 
China’s exports and, since US firms are major long term investors in China, 
a significant share of Chinese exports to the US comes from US companies.  
The importance of bilateral trading relationships, however, is not just the 
trade’s value but includes the dependency involved or how far other import 
sources or market outlets can be substituted. For China, the main areas of 
potential trade dependency include raw materials, such as iron and steel, 
grains, fibres and energy. In the first three, trade dependency is unlikely to 
be significant since markets are open and the materials substitutable if at 
some cost. This is also largely true for energy as well but energy has some 
special characteristics, as discussed below. China is dependent upon access 
to markets for its exports of manufactured goods and some vulnerability 
exists given its substantial dependence on US markets.  
China’s ability to coerce economically is also limited except on a 
symbolic ‘punishment’ basis to demonstrate displeasure. That might be 
significant for small countries. It is unlikely to be so for major countries. 
Other markets would be available for most exports from the US or Europe 
to China and the issue unimportant unless private interests involved are 
politically influential. With China’s substantial dependence on the US 
market, finding alternative markets for that volume of exports would be 
difficult and costly. Private interests, however, have in the past worked to 
protect China’s exports to the United States from undue punitive action.  
China has become a significant factor in the international capital market. 
Attention is normally directed to inward FDI movements which in recent 
years have usually exceeded US$40 billion annually. In 2002, with inwards 
FDI around $50 billion, China became the largest recipient of global FDI, 
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passing for the first time the US, normally the largest recipient. This, 
however, was largely because of a major dip in inward investment in the 
US. In addition, ‘round tripping’, Chinese domestic firms exporting and 
then importing investment capital to gain from preferred tax and intellectual 
property protection treatment for foreign firms, accounts for an element of 
the Chinese figures, estimates ranging between 5 and 20 per cent. Although 
FDI is mostly from non-Japan Asian countries, part of Hong Kong’s 
investment is from US and European affiliates in Hong Kong. Overall, 
however, the increased inflow reflected other factors, including expectations 
of economic opportunities due to improved regulatory frameworks flowing 
from China’s WTO membership and inflows from Japanese, Hong Kong, 
Taiwanese and to a degree South Korean firms relocating to China to reduce 
costs.  
Since the 1990s, Chinese entities—state owned enterprises (SOEs), but 
also Chinese cities, provincial governments, government departments and 
other state agencies—have become significant fundraisers on overseas 
capital markets, commonly through international investment banks in Hong 
Kong. A 2002 estimate suggests that some US$40 billion was raised in 
international markets from 1993–2000, around $21 billion of it in 2000, and 
much of it in the US. A further US$20 billion was raised in US dollar 
denominated international bond holdings.17 Further sizeable sums have 
come from governmental sovereign bond raisings and raisings by the 
remaining international trade and investment corporations (ITICs).  
China has also become a substantial foreign direct investor, accounting 
by 1995, for around 2 per cent of global capital exports.18 As an outlet for its 
large foreign exchange reserves, it is the second largest foreign holder of US 
Treasury Bonds after Japan, and a major purchaser of US government 
backed mortgage finance bonds. It is also an important purchaser of 
government securities in London, continental Europe and Tokyo.  
 
17  China Security Review Commission, Report to Congress: The national security implications of the 
economic relationship between the United States and China (Washington, DC: US Congress, 2002), 
Chapter 6. 
18  World Bank, China 2020: Development challenges in the new century (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 1997), p. 26. 
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In trade, whether China matters is often seen from a different perspective. 
For major products China may still be largely a price taker rather than a 
price maker. China’s extra supply of consumer goods on international 
markets does, however, have some downward effect on prices of labour 
intensive products. Among other things, this helps to counter the expected 
upward pressure on China’s exchange rate.  
While adversely affecting competitors, this price effect raises the living 
standards of those consuming those products. For example, with China now 
dominant in the global bicycle market (supplying over 60 per cent of the 
global market), average prices have fallen substantially. This benefits 
bicycle purchasers but there has been a geographic redistribution of bicycle 
production. Consequently, there are those, particularly in the US among 
industry lobbyists and leading politicians, who argue that China matters, but 
negatively through its adverse effect on employment in developed countries.  
As with bicycle producers in Western Europe given protection against 
Chinese competition but more generally, they reflect widely held fears that 
its low cost exports threaten living standards and jobs in developed 
economies. The fear has been reflected, for example, in the abnormal 
safeguard measures in the US’ WTO settlement with China and in US and 
French arguments pursuing labour standards in international trade 
negotiations.  
Production relocation effects in developed countries have often large 
local effects but are small at the macroeconomic level. For example, as 
noted earlier, China’s total exports are a small share of total US imports (9 
per cent) and imports a small share of total US GDP (7 per cent); imports 
from China are therefore only some 0.6 per cent of US GDP. In a growing 
world and domestic US economy, the necessary adjustments are manage-
able by those able to adjust. In a sluggish world economy, the adjustments 
required are likely to be more severe and difficult for those slow to adjust. 
Nevertheless, since like other countries, China exports essentially in order to 
import, the more it exports the more it can provide markets for imports that 
create employment in exporting countries.  
More generally, as China’s productive efficiency moves closer to that of 
developed economies, it contributes to increased global productivity and 
global real income, which will translate into greater spending and increased 
employment. Gains from trading between China and the rest of the world 
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increase living standards of China and its trading partners, for the former 
through higher incomes and in the latter case, more substantially through 
increased consumer purchasing power. It is not that employment elsewhere 
is not affected by China’s exports of labour intensive products, but that the 
overall magnitude of the effect is small, with larger effects due to other 
changes, notably technological change.  
There could be more substance in principle in the concerns about 
‘massive’ flows of productive capital from developed countries to emerging 
countries, and China in particular. Capital exported from developed 
countries is capital not invested in those countries putting downward 
pressure on their real incomes. Paul Krugman has shown, however, that in 
practice the domestic impact of shifting productive capital from developed 
countries to emerging countries is small.19 Developed country capital 
exports to China are not quantitatively large relative to capital investments 
made domestically in capital exporting countries. Moreover, China’s sub-
stantial purchases of bonds from the US and some other developed 
countries helps finance their trade and budget deficits.  
A second argument doubts the world’s capacity to absorb rapid increases 
in production of goods arising from ‘the manic logic of capitalism’,20 to 
which the industrial emergence of the developing world, and notably China, 
contributes. This is a new variant of an old fear of production outrunning 
demand or ‘global glut’21 but, as illustrated by the employment sharing 
efforts in France under Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in the late 1990s, is 
present in European politics as in the US. 
Yet, compared with the 1930s and Keynesian concerns at over saving 
and under consumption, many countries, including the US, now worry more 
about under saving and over consumption. While China’s growth adds to 
global productive capacity in labour intensive products, at present China 
contributes only a relatively small proportion of the global supply of the 
 
19  Paul Krugman, ‘Does Third World growth hurt First World prosperity’, Harvard Business Review 
72(4) July–August 1994, pp. 113–21. 
20  William Greider, One world, ready or not: The manic logic of global capitalism (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1997).  
21  Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, ‘No more NICS’, Foreign Policy 72 Fall 1988, pp. 81–103. 
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goods it exports. That it will add to that supply more substantively in the 
future seems probable given its entry into the WTO—helped, for textiles 
and clothing, by the eventual removal of quotas under the Multifibres 
Arrangement. With better macroeconomic policies than in the 1930s, 
however, the confidence that those gaining increased incomes in China 
from exports will spend them is more justified.  
China’s export expansion will not be limited to labour intensive products. 
As well as increasing exports of consumer durables, China is already the 
third largest exporter of electronic equipment, and is widely expected to 
become the major exporter of information technology products within a few 
years. These are commonly dual-use products, however, with strategic 
implications that some will see as increasingly problematic. 
These projected developments depend upon an international willingness 
to accept growing exports from China. This is particularly relevant for the 
US where China’s direct trade surplus remains substantial, although less so 
if Hong Kong is included. Moreover, what such a bilateral trade balance 
means in a globalised world is increasingly unclear since US firms are 
major participants in exports to the US. Overall, however, China has 
maintained a reasonable balance between export and import growth. Its 
trade surplus is gradually diminishing and it provides a substantially 
growing market for those exporting to it. The UN economic report for 2003 
notes that, given a global economy showing only modest growth overall, 
China’s domestic demand provided some stimulus to exports from other 
countries, but particularly in East Asia.22 
Nevertheless, China is not yet a major engine of global growth in general 
although in 2002, 15 per cent of global economic growth and 60 per cent of 
global export growth came from China. Although China’s direct economic 
impact is greater in the Asian region than in the global economy, it does 
have a global impact in specific areas. Particularly important is its growing 
demand for energy. China is a major consumer of primary energy, second 
only to the United States. Although a sizeable producer of oil, not far behind 
Iran, its growing energy demand has increasingly required oil and gas 
 
22  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World economic situation and 
prospects 2003 (New York: United Nations, 2003). 
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imports. It is extending its oil interests overseas investing, not just in the 
Middle East (notably Iran and Oman) but also in over 20 countries outside 
the Middle East including in Africa (Sudan), in the Western Hemisphere 
(Venezuela) and in Central Asia (Kazakhstan) and several developed 
countries, including the US.  
From some 70 million tonnes of net imports in 2002, estimates of future 
oil import needs range widely from 130 million tonnes to nearly 400 million 
tonnes by 2020.23 This could account for between 5 and 15 per cent of 
world oil trade, from its present 4 per cent. By 2030 China’s oil imports, 
according to the International Energy Agency’s Executive Director, ‘… will 
equal the imports of the United States today …’,24 and China will become a 
strategic buyer on world markets. That will make energy sourcing, 
diversification, and safety of its energy transport links even more influential 
and constraining on its foreign policy than it is already, given the 
vulnerability that import dependence implies.  
China is a major coal exporter, second after Australia, but more 
importantly, it is the second largest consumer of coal after the US. Its 
domestic use of coal makes it central to the global warming debate and 
negotiations around the Kyoto Protocol processes, since it provides around 
10 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions. World Bank estimates of 
China’s consumption of energy per unit of output (energy intensity) put it at 
three to ten times that of the major industrial countries.25 Again, the 
qualifying perspective of the PPP measures is important here: on a PPP 
basis, Angus Maddison estimated China’s energy intensity as higher than 
that of Germany and Japan but around US and Australian levels and greatly 
below that of Russia.26 
 
23  The higher figure is an International Energy Agency estimate; the lower is an official Chinese figure. 
International Energy Agency, China’s worldwide quest for energy security (Paris: International 
Energy Agency, 2000). 
24  International Energy Agency, Press Release, Beijing, 26 September 2002.  
25  World Bank, China 2020. 
26  Maddison, China’s economic performance in the long run, p. 155. 
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CHINA’S FUTURE GLOBAL IMPACT 
How far China will matter in economic terms in the future will depend 
upon the extent to which China can maintain its economic growth ahead 
of the major developed economies. Economic and employment growth is 
also critical to China’s internal stability. Officially, China aims to double 
its GDP over ten years, from 2000 to 2010, implying average annual 
growth rates of between 7 and 8 per cent. Projections of China’s economic 
growth range around these figures. World Bank estimates have ranged 
upwards from 6.5 per cent, while others believe higher rates are possible.  
In the trade field, the World Bank estimated that by 2020, China would 
be the second largest world trader, accounting for some 10 per cent of world 
exports, just behind the US.27 If its recent trade growth is sustained, it will 
certainly become an important influence on overall world trade growth.  
There is widely held optimism that these economic growth and trade 
rates, or rates near to them, are achievable. Yet others have less confidence, 
perhaps most notably Gordon Chang.28 The main doubts tend to centre on 
the sources of China’s economic growth; questions about currency reform; 
China’s ability to continue to attract high levels of FDI; the financial 
management of a banking system with large non-performing loans; loss-
making SOEs; and large government debts. Also in question is China’s 
political ability to absorb changes implied in China’s reform processes, 
including SOE reform; its WTO commitments and their consequences; and 
income imbalances between coastal and inner provinces, to which 
agriculture reform is a major contributor. How it manages these issues will 
largely determine how, and how far, China will ‘matter’ in the future, so I 
look briefly at each in turn.  
Sources of China’s growth 
I noted earlier the ongoing debate about China’s economic growth rate. 
Economists question whether the sources of China’s growth have been 
simply short-term quantitative factors—more labour and capital—or 
reflect more sustainable qualitative change—more efficient combinations 
 
27  World Bank, China 2020, p. 31. 
28  Gordon G. Chang, The coming collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001). 
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of labour and capital. Some argue that growth came predominantly from 
quantitative increases in resources—capital and previously under-
employed labour, implying that these were largely one-time gains and not 
a basis for sustained long-term growth. This argument is discussed in 
Heather Smith’s work.29 Like other studies she showed that quality 
improvements, through market reforms and technological catch-up, were 
increasing overall productivity. Zuliu Hu and Mohsin Khan, for example, 
argue that productivity growth accounted for nearly half China’s growth.30 
Scope for further growth through greater efficiency is still large with 
further reform, a continuing inflow of foreign technology and further 
opening of the economy to international competition.  
One question is whether China will continue to benefit from two finan-
cial pluses: the substantial inflow of foreign capital and high domestic 
personal saving. Much of China’s foreign capital inflow comes through 
FDI, although China has borrowed substantially from international 
institutions. Its ability to continue to attract large inflows of FDI depends 
upon domestic political stability and economic policies that attract foreign 
investors.  
FDI was critical to China’s past growth in supplying capital, in stimu-
lating exports, and in providing technology transfer and entrepreneurial 
skills. Yet although the inflow is large it represents, in domestic terms, only 
some 10 to 15 per cent of gross capital formation. It was central to China’s 
economic growth, however, when labour intensive exports were a major 
stimulus to growth.  
Initially, foreign companies had the advantage of access to funding and 
protection of intellectual property unavailable to domestic Chinese 
producers. FDI at that stage, moreover, was largely by small companies, 
mainly from non-Japan Asia, seeking to benefit from China’s cheap labour 
for export, but not offering transfers of advanced technologies. In that role, 
 
29  Heather Smith, ‘“Western” versus “Asian” capitalism: Is there anything new under the sun?’, in 
Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, eds, Asia–Pacific security: The economics–politics nexus (Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 1997), pp. 260–6. 
30  Zuliu Hu and Mohsin Khan, Why is China growing so fast?, Economic Issues No 8 (IMF) 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, June 1997). 
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FDI will be less critical in the future given the increased competitiveness of 
China’s domestic producers and their growing importance in its exports. 
Changes have benefited domestic producers as reforms have developed, 
and particularly after 1997.31 Meanwhile, larger European and Japanese 
companies have become more important investors, and technology transfer, 
if still limited, has increased. FDI will remain important to China now, 
therefore, through its contribution to China’s overall productivity growth. 
The evidence suggests no early diminution in foreign investor interest in 
China, although one investment motivation noted earlier, WTO entry, has a 
once-only character.  
Like FDI, maintenance of high domestic savings rates, the major source 
of China’s investment capital, depends in part at least on China’s domestic 
policies and reforms. 
Currency reform  
It reflects China’s growing importance in the trade and capital markets 
that its exchange rate policy is increasingly scrutinised by trading partners 
and competitors at global as well as regional levels.32 Because of its 
competitive position in international markets, a belief is emerging that its 
exchange rate influences significantly currency markets, notably US 
dollar and Japanese yen rates, disadvantaging those countries.  
China’s exchange rate is becoming more important in international 
currency markets. Yet, the Chinese yuan, tied to the US dollar, follows the 
dollar up and down. Periodically, it will be undervalued against other 
currencies as it was in 2002–03 following the weaker dollar, and be 
marginally undervalued against the dollar itself. Yet as recently as the 1997–
98 Asian economic crisis it was credited with stabilising the turbulent 
regional currency situation by not devaluing the yuan. 
Arguments abound about the merits of China’s maintaining a stable 
exchange rate. They include suggestions, usually by interested parties, that 
 
31  Yashing Huang, ‘Foreign direct investment in China: Why surging levels of FDI may indicate 
serious economic problems’, Presentation to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
16 January 2003, <www.ceip.org/files/events/events.asp?EventID=566>. 
32  ‘US must force China to drop yuan peg: Economist’, Business Times Online 31 January 2003. 
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not only is it deflationary but that China deliberately manipulates an 
undervalued currency for competitive purposes. As noted earlier, some 
deflationary effect undoubtedly results from the lower prices of China’s 
more competitive exports while its purchase of foreign securities provides 
some counter to upward exchange rate pressures. In the long run the yuan is 
likely to appreciate in line with productivity growth. Garnaut’s argument 
that the market and PPP rate will converge will probably hold eventually. In 
the short and medium run, however, that tendency could be outweighed  
by other domestic and international influences including further trade 
liberalisation. While China’s exchange rate already matters, for some time it 
is unlikely to matter sufficiently for any manipulation to be effective.  
Meanwhile, the yuan is only fully convertible on current account and is 
unlikely to be made convertible for capital transactions and to be floated 
until drastic reform to China’s banking system and other financial insti-
tutions has been effected.  
Domestic financial management and the banking system 
While acknowledging China’s growth potential, its capacity to sustain 
sufficient growth for domestic stability depends upon its success in 
managing effectively its full range of macroeconomic policies. So far, 
despite occasional missteps, it has been reasonably successful in its eco-
nomic and financial management. Managing a soft landing after inflation 
flared in the late 1980s and early 1990s was an important achievement, as 
were the elimination of the dual exchange rate system in 1994 and the 
relatively stable exchange rate system maintained since then, and the 
exclusion of the military from most of its business interests. It has also 
had some, if incomplete, success in reforming the banking system, in 
reducing its SOE problem, in dealing with corruption and smuggling, and 
in reforming the taxation system.  
Concerns have been expressed about China’s debt problems. As already 
observed, capital inflow other than FDI has been sizeable but the related 
debt burden does not represent a particular problem. China’s outstanding 
official international debt amounted to about 11 per cent of GDP in 2000. 
The debt is basically long-term and China has massive foreign exchange 
reserves.  
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Domestically, however, China has problems over the level of domestic 
government debt and of banking sector non-performing loans (NPLs). The 
official 16 per cent of GDP figure, if correct, would not raise undue 
concern. China has sustained domestic growth through deficit financing for 
a number of years, however, and that is expected to continue to absorb 
unemployment. Continued use of deficit financing to support China’s 
expansionary fiscal policy could provide future difficulties. Moreover, other 
estimates of government debt, as in the Economist, put it much higher, 
arguing that debt calculations should include the state-owned banking 
system’s NPLs.33  
Estimates of the banking sector NPLs themselves vary, ranging from the 
official figure of around 25 per cent to over 50 per cent. Since the major 
banks are state owned, the NPLs are a contingent government liability. 
China’s central bank accepts that NPLs and government contingent 
liabilities through state guarantees to banks amount to some 60 per cent of 
China’s GDP. NPLs seem to be diminishing only slowly in the face of 
government reform efforts. Although an important management problem, 
given the government’s ability to raise funds by selling government assets, 
including shares in the profitable among its SOEs, however, it is not 
ultimately a problem that could bring the system down.34 
Normally, however, such banking sector uncertainty would be expected 
to discourage high levels of private saving through the banking system. 
Expectations of government backing and limited alternatives to the banks as 
a depository of savings make this improbable in China. The benefit that 
China gains from its high level of personal savings is likely to continue.  
Every new loan to a loss-making enterprise crowds out potential good 
investments elsewhere. NPLs reflect a non-productive use of the capital 
involved by banks through lending to unprofitable SOEs, while the 
profitable and potentially employment absorbing private sector still has 
difficulty obtaining credit. Gradual entry of foreign banks under China’s 
 
33  Economist 13 June 2002. 
34  Shuanglin Lin, ‘China’s government debt: How serious?’, China: An International Journal 1(1) 
2003, p. 91. 
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WTO commitments will increase the pressure on local banks to compete 
effectively but also on the government if they cannot do so.  
State owned enterprises  
The banking sector’s problem of loans to non-performing SOEs arose 
substantially following attempted SOE reforms in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Direct government financing of SOEs was replaced by bank loans 
in a bid to enable them to operate and survive in the competitive 
environment of an increasingly marketised economy. This proved 
ineffective for various economic and political reasons. Recent reforms 
have relieved SOEs of the burden of redundant employees and allowed 
changes to SOE ownership structures, including privatising the smaller 
among them, making up about 80 per cent of the total number. These 
reforms appear to have been more effective.35 The SOEs now account for 
well under one-third of gross industrial output compared with around 
three-quarters in 1980. Nevertheless, despite major labour lay-offs, SOE 
employment remains well above its industrial output share as does the 
SOE share of total investment, reflecting a continued inefficient use of 
resources.  
SOE profitability has increased due in part to extraneous factors—falling 
interest rates, rising oil prices for the oil enterprises and bad debt write-
offs—but ownership structure and management reforms have also increased 
efficiency. Despite profit increases, with its high shares of resources and 
rates of return well below the non-state sector, the state owned sector 
remains a drag on China’s economic growth. The murky ties between the 
party, state, provincial governments and the SOEs slow reform and help still 
to channel bank credit to the loss-making among them. Despite significant 
improvement, therefore, without further structural reform in the state 
ownership sector, scope for increased productivity and exports will be 
diminished.  
 
35  Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song, Yang Yao and Xialo Wang, Private enterprise in China (Canberra and 
Beijing: Asia Pacific Press and China Centre for Economic Research, 2001), p. 16; Xialu Wang, 
‘State-owned enterprise reform: Has it been effective?’, in Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song, eds, 
China 2002: WTO entry and world recession (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2002), pp. 29–44. 
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Political support for reform 
China is undergoing a massive industrial revolution and its dynamics 
create considerable political and social stresses in China as historically 
such dynamics have in other countries. Many demonstrations have been 
reported in northern and western provinces in particular, where unemploy-
ment due to SOE and other reforms is relatively severe. The reform 
process and failures of governance associated with corruption, unemploy-
ment and falling incomes in rural areas could be politically destabilising 
unless adequately addressed by China’s government. So, too, could 
accommodating pressures for ‘democratisation’.  
Income inequality has continued to increase, even though in most years 
all incomes have risen.36 Several factors contribute to the growing 
inequality. Essentially, China is condensing its industrial revolution into a 
historically remarkably short period. Moreover, some inequality is neces-
sary to encourage labour movement from the interior to the coastal 
economy to meet the latter’s long term labour needs and to facilitate 
productivity growth through modernisation in China’s agriculture. Too great 
an income discrepancy creates social problems, however, particularly if, 
rather than arising from differential rates of income growth, it reflects 
absolute falls in real incomes in the interior, as has been the case in some 
provinces in recent years. Efforts to limit this problem continue. 
Considerable state infrastructure investment has been directed to the inner 
provinces; around 20 per cent of China’s FDI has been going to the interior 
regions. This constitutes some 10 per cent of the interior economy, 
paralleling experience in other countries, notably the US.37 
A more comprehensive welfare system is an accepted need. Those 
receiving social security rose to over 12 million in 2002 but this is still small 
compared with the urban unemployed estimated at over 40 million.38 
Moreover the pension system is in financial difficulties, and with 
 
36  Wang Shaogang, Hu Angang and Ding YuanZhu, ‘Behind the China wealth gap’, South China 
Morning Post 31 October 2002. 
37  Huang, ‘Foreign direct investment in China’. 
38  Wang, Hu and Ding, ‘Behind the China wealth gap’. 
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subsistence payments to the unemployed, constitute an increasing claim on 
current budget expenditures  
CONCLUSION 
Segal’s broad conclusion was that China’s small market mattered little to 
the world. That conclusion now needs substantial qualification. China’s 
vast population and size give it the basis for a major global political 
presence; its geographic spread (fourteen land borders and a number of 
sea borders) ensures that its economic presence is widely felt globally as 
well as regionally; in addition, it is a relatively important economic 
partner of the US and other major powers outside of Asia. Continuation of 
China’s growth at high rates of between 6 and 8 per cent in, say, the next 
two decades is at least a plausible prognostication. 
Consequently, while not yet a major engine of global growth, China does 
matter not just regionally but globally in economic terms. The more com-
plex question is how much does it matter. There are no readily applicable 
criteria and judgements differ according to the starting perspective. 
Certainly, as Segal said, China is still only a middle power. But attitudes 
towards a middle power that will remain a middle power differ substantially 
from one likely to become a great power in economic terms. Few doubt 
China’s potential to become a great power, even if it faces ‘a long and 
winding road’. Perhaps as critical in determining how China is perceived 
and responded to, and despite doubts expressed by some commentators, 
China’s leaders have shown a capacity to deal effectively enough with its 
internal problems to progress rapidly and at the same time to maintain 
stability. This gives it an advantage over Japan.  
China’s population will become substantially better off but for some time 
to come will remain relatively poor. Consumer income will grow, however, 
and consumption will grow with it, further enlarging China’s market. 
China’s participation in the global capital market, still relatively small, is 
growing in importance, politically as well as economically; so is its 
increasing involvement in the global energy market.  
Of the economic impacts of China’s continuing economic growth, two 
seem to gain considerable attention: its role vis-à-vis global competitors, 
and the international market’s ability to absorb China’s increased 
production. Even though the former is inevitable, but not quantitatively 
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large, it may still matter politically and lead to more disputes over China’s 
exports in major markets.  
For the latter, while China’s development will increase global productive 
capacity, global incomes will also increase. While demand will increase 
along with supply, the location of distribution will change, with impacts 
outside East Asia likely on producers in countries such as India and Mexico. 
That the quality of China’s exports is likely to continue to rise, as China’s 
export structure moves towards dual-use electronic goods and machinery, 
will give rise at times to strategic issues and concerns.  
For some US Congress members and some senior academics,39 fear of 
China’s economic growth potential already warrants counter action by the 
US. The hurdles activists are likely to succeed in placing in China’s way, 
however, are probably less important than the hurdles China faces 
domestically to maintain its economic development. 
China’s growth will require massive infrastructure investments in 
transport, power, water, urban systems, telecoms, and desertification and 
environmental controls. Its energy demands, and growing energy import 
needs, also require major foreign and domestic investments. And its needs 
to provide enhanced employment opportunities are great.  
China has shown a capacity to surmount many of its major domestic 
challenges while maintaining reasonable budget disciplines. Further chal-
lenges, such as the essential reform of the financial system and the reform 
of SOEs are being addressed, if less effectively. Given the further reforms 
still needed, major problems of social discontent and control could emerge 
beyond those already being experienced. More basic requirements include 
effective management of crises such as AIDS and SARS. They also include 
no significant internal or external conflict. Conflict for China is more likely 
with a weak and unstable rather than a strong China.40 
China’s emergence as a major economic power participating fully in the 
working of international economic institutions already influences the global 
 
39  John Mearsheimer, The tragedy of great power politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 
40  Philip Bobbitt, The shield of Achilles: War, peace and the course of history (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 2002), p. 781. 
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economic system. But China has been participating in the international 
institutions very much as a status quo country and, while not without 
qualifications, with a manifest national interest in supporting the funda-
mentals of the existing economic system. In assessing whether China 
matters, it is not enough simply to judge it on its activities and performance 
to date. It is worth also considering how much this contributor to regional 
stability and global growth could become a major global problem if it 
behaved in a destabilising fashion.  
Ultimately, therefore, while Gerry Segal’s injunction not to over 
emphasise China’s importance remains useful, his article’s conclusion that, 
in effect, China could be largely ignored, no longer holds true in economic 
terms. China is no longer peripheral economically and although far from the 
dominant giant often argued or feared, it does matter and its concerns and 
interests do have to be taken into account. Moreover, as a rising power, 
where it will be in the future rather than where it is today is what influences 
policy thinking in most countries. For most governments, China is a country 
that matters not just regionally but also at the global level.   
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